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NOTES
RECOUPING THE LOSSES OF BROOKE GROUP
Competition... brings out the only... arrangement of social production
which is possible . . . . [Otherwise] what guarantee [do] we have that the
necessary quantity and not more of each product will be produced, that we
shall not go hungry in regard to corn and meat while we are choked in beet
sugar and drowned in potato spirit, that we shall not lack trousers to cover
our nakedness while buttons flood us in the millions.
-Friedrich Engelst
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an industry dominated by six large firms.2 All six firms make
an enormous profit, because their market control allows them to charge
excessively high prices. One of these firms, Firm A, has a steadily falling
market share. In an attempt to regain its market share and increase its
profitability, Firm A reduces the price of its product by thirty percent. This
strategy yields instant success, quadrupling Firm A's market share.
As a result of Firm A's success, the other five firms suffer an unwel-
come loss of sales and profits. In order to teach Firm A a lesson and to
eventually return the price of its product to extravagant levels, Firm B cuts
the price of its product below its cost of production.3 Consequently, Firm
A loses most of its newly found and rightfully earned business to Firm B
and society now produces too much of the product. Thus, consumer welfare
decreases.4
1. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMIcs: PRINcmLEs AND PoLIcY 556 (4th ed.
1988) (quoting Friedrich Engels).
2. The following hypothetical is based on Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). See infra notes 131-65 and accompanying text. The Brooke Group
decision created the problem which this Note will address, namely the addition of a recoupment
requirement in actions alleging predatory pricing under the antitrust laws.
3, At this point, a definition of "cost of production" will not be considered. For such a discussion,
see infra notes 60-77, 117-21 and accompanying text.
4. At first glance, a statement that consumer welfare decreases when firms lower the price of their
products seems preposterous. For a discussion of the economic argument explaining how consumers
lose a portion of their net wealth from this type of price decrease, see infra notes 176-85 and
accompanying text.
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Because Firm A began this story in financial trouble, it can only match
Firm B's below-cost pricing for a short time without going out of business.
Firm B, with its larger market share and stronger financial position, can
afford to maintain below-cost prices for a longer period. This disparity
leaves Firm A with two choices: return its prices to the supracompetitive
levels existing before the price cut or sue Firm B in federal court for
practicing predatory pricing in violation of federal antitrust laws.' Firm A
chooses to sue, but the United States Supreme Court denies the validity of
their claim. Instead, the Court adds a new recoupment requirement 6 to
predatory pricing claims and further states that firms in an oligopoly setting
can almost never recoup losses brought about by below-cost pricing. Thus,
Firm A loses its antitrust lawsuit and the scope of market protection
available in the future from the antitrust laws is lessened significantly.
Left without any legal remedy, Finn A then succumbs to the pressure
and raises its prices. Over the course of the next few years, the now-
disciplined oligopoly raises prices in lock-step twice a year. Who ends up
the big loser? The consumer.
The Supreme Court caused such a perverse result in Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.7-- the facts of which are loosely
reflected in the above hypothetical--when it added a recoupment
requirement to predatory pricing claims.9 As Judge Stevens points out in
his dissent,' ° the Brooke Group facts illustrate one serious drawback to
imposing a recoupment requirement: finns can now use below-cost pricing
to discipline industry participants and maintain an oligopoly.
This Note addresses other negative implications of the Brooke Group
decision. Part II begins with a history of the applicable antitrust laws. Part
I describes the oligopoly problem facing the United States. Part IV
outlines the law regarding predatory pricing as it stood prior to the Brooke
Group holding. Part V then discusses the Court's new recoupment rule and
its reasons for adopting such a rule. Finally, after an evaluation of the
5. Specifically, Firm A would claim that Firm B engaged in predatory pricing in violation of § 2
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), or primary line discrimination in violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). See discussion infra notes 101-31 and
accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
7. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
8. The hypothetical is not exactly true to the Brooke Group facts but it preserves the essence of
the case presented to the Court. See supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
9. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588-89.
10. Id. at 2598.
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recoupment approach, this Note concludes that the Supreme Court should
remove the recoupment requirement. In the absence of such a ruling, the
lower courts should not enforce the requirement strictly in future antitrust
litigation.
11. ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
Scholars continually debate the purpose of the antitrust laws." Some
argue that Congress was mainly concerned with achieving noneconomic
goals, such as the protection of small businesses and consumers. 2 Others
conclude that the antitrust laws were intended solely to facilitate economic
efficiency. 3 From either of these two perspectives, the Court's recoup-
ment requirement in Brooke Group seems inappropriate.14
A. The Noneconomic Camp
On one side of the spectrum, commentators put forth a wide variety of
noneconomic goals for federal antitrust regulation. Examples include
dispersing economic and political power, deconcentrating markets and
protecting small businesses. 5 The noneconomic camp acknowledges,
however, that courts also should consider economic goals in antitrust
cases. 6 Although these economic and noneconomic goals often conflict
and lead to inconsistent results, 7 scholars in the noneconomic camp do
11. HERBERT HOVENKAM, EcoNOmICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.4, at 50 (1985); see
also Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67 (1982) (stating that "[c]onsiderable
dispute over the goals of antitrust has surfaced in scholarly commentary on the subject").
12. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 1076 (1979); see also infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text. In this Note, I will refer
to this group of scholars as the noneconomic camp.
'3. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966). In this Note, I will refer to this group of scholars as the economic camp.
A third group of scholars asserts that the goal of antitrust laws was to put an end to "unfair" wealth
transfers from consumers to monopolists. Lande, supra note 11, at 68. Because most of the debate
involves economic versus noneconomic goals, this Note will include wealth transfers in the general
noneconomic category.
14. See infra notes 166-93 and accompanying text.
15. Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1,
1 (1982).
16. HovENKw', supra note I 1, § 2.1, at 42 (stating that "[e]conomic theory enables the multi-
valued policy maker to estimate the relative costs of protecting certain noneconomic values and helps
her determine whether society should be willing to pay the price").
17. Id.
1995]
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not think that these inconsistencies justify eliminating noneconomic goals.
They argue instead that the responsibility lies with the courts to balance
successfully the competing economic and noneconomic antitrust policies
considered by Congress."8
Proponents of the noneconomic perspective advance several pieces of
evidence that arguably establish congressional intent to use antitrust laws
to pursue noneconomic goals. First, these commentators point to the
historical setting prior to the passage of the Sherman Act. 9 During this
period, trusts and fins were engaged in a drive to accumulate market
power that was triggered by the overcapacity problems of the industrial
revolution.2" These trusts and firms accumulated vast market power21 and
used this power to prevent consumers from purchasing competitively priced
goods and to eliminate competing sellers.' When Congress passed the
Sherman Act, the public opposed the trusts because of their negative impact
on free competition and, particularly, on small businesses. Accordingly,
protection of small businesses and free competition became a central goal
of the Sherman Act.'
Scholars in the noneconomic camp also point to the Sherman Act's
legislative history to bolster their assertion that the Act was intended to
protect competitors as well as competition.24 Statements by congress-
men and the plain language of the Sherman Act support the position that
18. Id. For example, Hovenkamp stated that "[a]ntitrust could reasonably be expected to balance
a policy of low consumerprices against a policy of protecting small businesses from larger competitors,
and choose different policies to win in different cases." Id. § 2.1, at 42; see also id. § 2.4, at 50-53.
Other areas of the law successfully balance competing policies. For example, many constitutional
decisions weigh opposing policies. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 815 (1978).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
20. See Thomas K. McCraw, Rethinking the Trust Question, in REGULATION IN PERSPECIVE:
ISTORICAL ESSAYS 1, 1 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981).
21. Lande, supra note 11, at 105. Lande stated that:
Congress passed the Sherman Act to further a number of goals. Its main concern was with
firms acquiring or possessing enough market power to raise prices artificially and to restrict
output. Congress' primary aim was to enable consumers to purchase products at competitive
prices.. . .All purchasers, whether consumers or businesses, were given the right to purchase
competitively priced goods. All sellers were given the right to face rivals selling at
competitive prices.
Id.
22. Id; see also BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 1, at 701.
23. Lande, supra note 11, at 105; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 16.
24. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1076-77.
25. For example, during debates on the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman stated that "[i]t is the right
of every man to work, labor and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his production on
[VOL. 73:609
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Congress desired to achieve more than mere economic efficiency.26
The antitrust statutes passed after the Sherman Act further manifest a
congressional intent that antitrust law achieve goals other than economic
efficiency.27 In its subsequent enactments, Congress displayed a desire to
protect small businesses from larger competitors.28 For example, the
Robinson-Patman Act2 9 was designed principally to afford market
protection to small businesses.3" Congress drafted this legislation in
response to concerns that large chain stores were bribing their customers
with low prices to destroy smaller competitors.31
In addition to citing federal laws, scholars of the noneconomic camp
explain that the concept of economic efficiency had not yet developed
equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and lies at the
foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890).
26. For example, a conspiracy to put one competitor out of business violates the Sherman Act
regardless of any showing of significant economic impact. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1078.
27, Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1060-61 (1979).
The ambiguous wording of the Sherman Act, in particular terms such as "restraint of trade" and
"monopolize," necessitates further inquiry into subsequent antitrust statutes to find Congress' specific
intent. Id.
28. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 50-51.
29, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). The Robinson-Patman Act states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to be a party to, or assist in,
any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which discriminates to his knowledge against
competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service
charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or
advertising service charge available at the time of such transaction to said competitors in
respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods
in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere
in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor
in such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low
prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor... or, to sell,
or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition
or eliminating a competitor.
Id
30. HovENKAMw, supra note 11, § 2-4. In addition, consider the following quotation by
Congressman Patman when he introduced the bill: "[I]t is one of the first duties of Government to
protect the weak against the strong and prevent men from injuring one another." 80 CONG. REC. 3447
(1936). Congress was also interested in supporting small businesses when it enacted the Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts. Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 19.
31. Hugh C. Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1113,
1123 (1983). Critics of Robinson-Patman have called the Act the "Typhoid Mary of Antitrust," "a
grotesque manifestation of the scissors and paste pot method" and something "with which economic
nonsense is associated." Id. at 1114. Nonetheless, the Act has survived amendment attempts and remains
the law today. Id. at 1114 & n.7; see also EARL W. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER: A GIDE
TO THE LAW AGAINST PRICE DISCRIMINATION 344 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that Congress created the
Robinson-Patman Act to prevent large chain stores from driving local retailers out of business, despite
the large chains' ability to offer temporarily lower prices).
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when Congress passed the Sherman Act.32 In fact, allocative efficiency 3
did not emerge as an economic theory until twenty years later.34 Thus, the
primary purpose of antitrust law could not have been economic efficien-
cy.3
5
The Supreme Court's opinions often reflect agreement with the views of
the noneconomic camp.36 However, the Court's ultimate views on the
goals of antitrust law remain unclear.37 One case frequently cited-and
cited incorrectly as defining the goals of antitrust 1aw 3 -- is Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States.39 In Brown Shoe, the Court stated that "[i]t is
competition, not competitors, which the [Sherman] Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. 4 ° Courts have relied
on parts of this quotation to support both a noneconomic and an economic
32. HoVENKAW, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 50.
33. Economists define allocative efficiency in terms of the welfare of society as a whole. A society
is allocatively efficient if it achieves the greatest possible social benefit from its available resources.
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINMELD, MICROECONOMIcS 579-80 (1989) (referring to allocative
efficiency as output efficiency); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2.2, at 46.
34. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 50. Allocative efficiency developed in 1909 when
Vilfredo Pareto formed his concept of Pareto optimality. Id. In fact, most of current economics did not
come into being until after the 1930s. Lande, supra note 11, at 88 n.97.
Economists define Pareto optimality as follows: "a given assignment of resources is most efficient
('Pareto Optimal') if no alternative assignment will make at least one person better off without making
at least one person worse off as well." HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2.2, at 46. Antitrust law uses a
more serviceable translation. "A change is efficient ... if the gainers from the change gain enough so
that they can fully compensate all losers out of their gains-that is, if the total value placed on the gains
exceeds the total value placed on the losses." Id. Actual compensation of the losers out of the winners'
gains, however, is not necessary for efficiency to be achieved. Id. at 47.
35. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, at 50.
36. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945);
Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457,465-66 (1941); Charles A. Ramsey
Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1922); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609-11 (1914).
37. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 231 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., concurring).
38. In fact, the Court in Brooke Group adopted just such a misinterpretation. See Infra text
accompanying notes 174-75.
39. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
40. Id. at 344.
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interpretation of the antitrust laws.41 If anything, it seems the Court
believes that both economic and noneconomic goals merit consideration.
B. The Economic Camp
As indicated previously, another group of scholars believe that antitrust
law should consider only economic goals.42 Proponents of this school of
thought recognize the congressional intent to achieve noneconomic
goals,43 but they argue that courts can ignore this legislative intent because
the Sherman Act reflects common law." These scholars assert that
Congress did not intend to solidify common law as it lived in 1890, but to
allow the common law to change.45 In practice, courts view the antitrust
laws as merely an enactment of the common law46 and often deviate from
the law as it stood in the nineteenth century.47 Thus, scholars of the
economic camp argue that the antitrust laws empower courts to respond to
the changing times."
Advocates of the economic camp further assert that shifting perspectives
require application of the antitrust laws primarily for the purpose of
increasing economic efficiency.49 In order to achieve this increased
efficiency, members of the economic camp propose that courts should
41. Examples of cases in which the Court relied on the theory that "it is competition, not
competitors, which the [Sherman] Act protects" include: Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986);
Copprweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984); Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
Examples of cases in which the Court relied on other statements in Brown Shoe-namely, "we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small,
locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from
the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets .... Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344-include:
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co. 410 U.S. 526, 542 (1973) (concurring opinion); Ford Motor Co.
v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 n.12 (1972); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 580 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 & n.14 (1966); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360 n.37 (1963).
42. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. Hovenkamp, supra note 15.
44. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2A, at 50.
45. Id. Senator Sherman stated that the Sherman Act "sets out in the most specific language the
rule of the common law which prevails in England and this country." 20 CONG. REc. 1167 (1889).
46. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1940).
47. HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 52.
48. Id. at 52-53.
49. 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNEP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 904 (1978).
19951
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increase consumer welfare through the teachings of price theory. ° Price
theory defines economic efficiency as "maximizing consumer economic
welfare through efficiency in the use and allocation of scarce resources." 1
Scholars of the economic camp believe that price theory can identify those
actions that increase efficiency and thus should be deemed lawful.52
According to this argument, exclusively striving to maximize consumer
welfare yields several other benefits: it gives clear notice to competitors of
what they can do to compete, it places responsibility for political decisions
on Congress instead of the courts, it preserves the character of the
legislative process, it results in court decisions based on economic
principles, and it avoids capricious or anticonsumer judicial rulings. 3
Even if one disputes the benefits of exclusively pursuing the economic
efficiency goal, advocates of the economic camp also find support for their
position in the legislative history of the antitrust laws.54 For example,
50. Posner, supra note 13, at 932. Basically, price theory assumes "that businessmen are rational
profit maximizer .... that demand curves slope downward, that an increase in the price of a product
will reduce the demand for its complement [and] that resources gravitate to the areas where they will
achieve the highest return, etc." Id. at 928; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANrr UsT PARADOX 116-
17 (1978). For a more detailed discussion of price theory economics, sometimes also called consumer
welfare economics, see infra notes 51-53, 59-77 and accompanying text.
51. 1 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 49, $ 103, at 7. Economists define efficiency in the
allocation of scarce resources, known as allocative efficiency or output efficiency, as the situation in
which society "produce[s] goods in combinations that match people's willingness to pay for them."
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 33, at 579. Economists define efficiency in the use of scarce
resources, known as productive efficiency, as the situation in which "the output of one good cannot be
increased without decreasing the output of another good." Id. at 575.
Commentators from the economic camp have stated that "[t]he whole task of antitrust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency."
BORK, supra note 50, at 91. This Note criticizes that contention because the Court in Brooke Group
changed the law in such a way as to injure allocative efficiency, a result the economic camp would
admonish. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
Bork concluded that the word "competition," in antitrust law, "must be understood as a term of art
signifying any state of affairs in which consumerwelfare cannot be increased byjudicial decree." BORK,
supra note 50, at 51. In fact. the use of price theory is prevalent in the courts today. See Posner, supra
note 13, at 932. For two pertinent examples, see Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) and Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct 884 (1993).
52. Bor, supra note 50, at 116 ("[P]rice theory enables us to identify ... those activities whose
primary effect is output restricting, leading to the inference that all other activity is either efficiency
creating or neutral.").
53. Id. at 81. Bork also concluded that an antitrust approach with multiple goals, including social
goals, "can achieve none of these things." Id.
54. Bork, supra note 13 (discussing specific legislative history and record of Sherman Act's
passage). Despite Bork's and the economic camp's views, most students of the Sherman Act's history
have determined that Congress had many goals in addition to economic efficiency. In fact, the
"legislative history contains little discussion of efficiency as we understand it." Hovenkamp, supra note
[VOL. 73:609
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Senator Sherman's first draft of his bill made illegal agreements "designed,
or which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer.""5 Additionally,
Congress chose to allow monopolies that had gained their status due to
superior efficiency to survive as legal entities.56 Finally, proponents of the
economic camp suggest that Congress, due to its limited view of its own
powers in 1890, would not have attempted to pass laws of a social,
noncommercial nature. 7 Thus, the economic camp argues, the legislative
history of the antitrust laws illustrates the fact that Congress had, as its
exclusive goal, the maximization of consumer welfare. 8
Assuming that the economic camp correctly states that economic
efficiency is and should be the goal of antitrust law, one must understand
the economic models involved. 9 Economists divide the concept of
15, at 17.
55. BOK, supra note 50, at 20.
56. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
"15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Note that Congress chose not to make it a felony merely
to possess a monopoly. BORK, supra note 50, at 62. As additional proof, Bork offered the following
quotation from Senator Sherman: "[The courts] will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of
production and unlawful combination to prevent competition and in restraint of trade." Id. at 63.
57. BORK, supra note 50, at 62. Congress had a limited view of its constitutional powers in 1890,
as its members generally believed "that the ends to be accomplished by an exercise of the commerce
power must themselves be of a commercial nature and not attempts 'to regulate the good order of
society."' Id.
58. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act poses the toughest challenge to the
economic camp's reasoning. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. The economic camp's
response was best characterized by Robert Bork:
No doubt that many of the backers of the Robinson-Patman Act were moved by an NRA-style
philosophy and intended to protect independent merchants against chains and new methods
of distribution. But it is not at all clear that the congressmen who voted for the bill knew that
they were sacrificing consumers for the benefit of small merchants. Indeed, ... many
congressmen thought the law would serve consumers by preserving small merchants ....
[T]he legislative history shows predominant concern for consumers, with protection of small
competitors intended only when that was a means of protecting consumers ....
BoRIC, supra note 50, at 63-64.
59. Using the following economic analysis, scholars in the Chicago school, referred to herein more
generally as the economic camp, believe that:
[s]elling below cost in order to drive out a competitor is unprofitable even in the long run,
except in the unlikely case in which the intended victim lacks equal access to capital to
finance a price war. The predator loses money during the period of predation and, if he tries
to recoup it later by raising his price, new entrants will be attracted, the price will be bid
down to the competitive level, and the attempt at recoupment will fail. Most alleged instances
of below-cost pricing must, therefore, be attributable to factors other than a desire to eliminate
competition.
PosNER, supra note 13, at 927 (citations omitted). Assuming that attempts to price at a predatory level
do not frequently occur if they occur at all, some in the Chicago school believe that a rule of law that
Washington University Open Scholarship
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economic efficiency into two branches: allocative efficiency and productive
efficiency.' Because the major "task" of antitrust law is to improve
allocative efficiency, 6' this discussion will focus on allocative efficiency.
Allocative efficiency "refers to the placement of resources in the econo-
my."'62 It requires the use of all of society's resources such that no greater
level of consumer welfare can be achieved through an alternative
management of resources.
63
Under perfect competition,' an economy achieves allocative efficiency.
An "equilibrium" state of resource allocation occurs when the demand
curve and the supply curve intersect.65 Because the demand curve 6
represents the marginal benefits to society and the supply curve67
represents the marginal costs, their intersection represents a maximization
of consumer welfare. Society reaches this equilibrium through the markets'
continual price adjustments.6"
The existence of a monopoly destroys this perfect allocation of
resources.69 A monopolist understands that his output decisions affect
outlaws those attempts will only rob consumers of the benefits of price decreases due to normal
competition and superior efficiency. See BoRic, supra note 50, at 149-55.
Others in the Chicago school do not agree with the above analysis. They agree that predatory
pricing, while unlikely, still exists under certain conditions. For example, predatory pricing might occur
in an industry with high barriers to entry or in which simply having a reputation as a predator would
deter firms from entering the market. Therefore, even though predatory pricing may be unlikely,
antitrust law should still prohibit such economically inefficient conduct. Benefits that consumers receive
from other, legal competition can be protected through cautious prosecution of predatory pricing
offenses. See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
60. BORK, supra note 50, at 91. Economists define productive efficiency as "the effective
coordination of the various means of production in each industry into such groupings as will produce
the greatest result." Id. (citations omitted); see also note 51.
61. BoRK, supra note 50, at 91. Basically, allocative efficiency here refers to "the placement of
resources in the economy, the question of whether resources are employed in tasks where consumers
value their output most." Id; see also supra note 51.
62. See supra note 51.
63. See supra note 51.
64. For a discussion of the perfect competition model, see HOVENKAMP, supra note I1, § 1.1.
65. This "equilibrium" state denotes a condition where the marginal benefit received from use of
a particular resource exactly equals the marginal cost of that resource, thus maximizing the available
benefit. See BORK, supra note 50, at 98.
66. A demand curve represents the benefits that society places on each additional unit of a
particular good. Id. at 97.
67. The supply curve represents the cost to society of each additional unit of production of a
particular good. Id.
68. Boni., supra note 50, at 98.
69. See generally BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 1, at 604-06.
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price.7" As a result, the monopolist's marginal revenue curve will have a
steeper slope than the demand curve. The intersection of the
monopolist's marginal revenue curve with the marginal cost curve will be
to the left of the equilibrium intersection of the demand curve and the
marginal cost curve.72 Thus, the monopolist will maximize profits at an
output level that is less than socially optimal. 3
This monopolist's price and output decisions are detrimental to consumer
welfare, because social costs no longer equal social benefits.74 The
reduced output resulting from a monopoly means that resources are placed
in an industry (or, alternatively, left idle) such that the benefit they yield
for society is less than it would be if these resources were used in the
monopolized industry.75 Society achieves less wealth than it could have
if the resources had been used in the monopolized industry.76 This
decrease in consumer welfare through the misallocation of resources is
70. Id. at 600-01. The reasoning behind this statement comes from the fact that the monopolist
does not have the usual supply curve that all firms face in a perfectly competitive industry. "[A]
monopolist is not at the mercy of the market; he does not have to take the market price as given and
react to it. Instead, the monopolist has the power to ... select the price-quantity combination on his
demand curve that he prefers." Id. at 601. Thus, when a monopolist picks the quantity he wishes to sell,
he determines the price. For an explanation of the concept of a firm in perfect competition as a "price-
taker," one that cannot set the price based on the amount it produces, see id. at 559-61.
71. Id. at 602. A monopolist's marginal revenue curve is below its demand curve because:
[a] monopolist normally must charge the same price to all his customers. So, if he wants to
raise his sales by one unit, he must lower his price somewhat to all his customers .... Thus,
the additional revenue that he takes in when he increases sales by one unit (his marginal
revenue) is the price he collects from his new customer minus the revenue he loses by cutting
the price paid by all his old customers. This means that [marginal revenue] is necessarily less
than price ....
Id.
72. BAUMOL & BLuNDER, supra note 1, at 603-06. Marginal cost is defined as the addition to total
cost resulting from increasing production by one unit. Id. at 601.
73. Economists call this an inefficient allocation of resources. The monopolist is assessing a greater
price and producing less output than would a firm in a competitive industry. Id at 605-06.
Despite the monopoly's evils, economists find some benefits to monopolies. For example,
monopolists have a greater incentive to advertise and thereby increase demand, for the increase in
demand will cause the monopolist to increase its output. Thus, the difference in the output between a
monopoly and an industry in perfect competition may not be all that significant. Of course, a major
difference in price will still exist, because the monopolist will charge much more for the same goods.
Id. at 606-07.
Economists recognize other benefits of monopoly as well, namely that monopolies aid in innovation,
that a single monopoly producing all the products in an industry may be the cheapest mode of
production, and that monopolists internalize pollution costs while a perfect competitor, absent regulation,
does not. Id. at 607-08.
74. BoRK, supra note 50, at 101.
75. Id.
76. Id,
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allocative inefficiency.77
Economists assert that, due to the inefficiencies of monopolies, Congress
should regulate giant firms.78 Proponents of the economic camp argue that
antitrust law should attempt to accomplish such regulation by stopping
attempts to form monopolies only when such attempts are not in and of
themselves efficient.79 The economic camp identifies one of these types
of inefficient attempts as "predation."8 °
One form of "predation" includes below-cost pricing.8' A firm that
eliminates its competitors by selling at prices below its cost does not
compete "on the merits."82 Scholars of the economic camp, however, warn
that some price reduction and the subsequent elimination of competitors is
efficient. 3 For example, a firm might lower its prices due to superior
efficiency that results in lower cost structures.84 Antitrust law, according
to the economic camp, must distinguish this situation from one in which
below-cost predatory pricing exists. 5 If the law does not make this
77. Id. For a definition of allocative efficiency, see supra note 61 and accompanying text. Posner
noted that there exists a second cost of monopoly, in addition to the misallocation of resources. This
cost refers to the likelihood that:
an opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly profits will
attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize .... The costs of the resources so
used are costs of monopoly just as much as the costs resulting from the substitution of
products that cost society more to produce than the monopolized product.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11 (1976).
78. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 33, at 355-56.
79. See BORK, supra note 50, at 98-101. Bork stated that not all monopolies should be deemed
illegal because, at times, the monopoly's increased productive efficiency can offset the losses to
alloeative efficiency. Id. at 98; see also supra note 73.
80. "Predation" is defined as:
a firm's deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through the employment of business
practices that would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either that
1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the predator with a market share sufficient
to command monopoly profits, or 2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon
competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or threatening. Since these results are
detrimental to consumer welfare, predation is not to be classed as superior efficiency.
BORK, supra note 50, at 144.
81. Id. at 149-55.
82. Areeda & Turner, supra note 59, at 697.
83. BORK, supra note 50, at 137.
84. Id.
85. Id. Such distinctions are not easy to make. Firms often decrease their prices in response to
increased competition, a technological innovation, or superior efficiency. Without an insider's view, a
court can never truly determine whether one of these acceptable purposes actually motivated the price
decrease or whether the firm decreased its price to eliminate a rival. Id. For Areeda and Turner's
solution to this problem, see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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distinction, it inevitably will dampen some amount of productive behav-
ior.86
The above discussion outlines the two major viewpoints regarding the
goals of antitrust law.87 Before applying these goals to the predatory
pricing case law and the new recoupment requirement, one must understand
the "oligopoly problem."
III. THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Most of the goods produced in the United States economy are sold in an
oligopolistic market structure.88 Under this structure, a small group of
sellers can avoid competitive forces and achieve a higher-than-competitive
price, just as a monopoly does, 9 by acting in concert. Moreover, sellers
in an oligopoly can do so without actually entering into an agreement that
would violate the Sherman Act."
The mechanism most frequently used by oligopolies to charge
supracompetitive prices is "price leadership."91 Through price leadership,
one oligopolist sets the price for a good. Other oligopolists, known as
"price followers," then set the same price for their goods.92 Each
oligopolist has an incentive to follow the "price leader": they know that
undercutting the leader will reduce profit over time by triggering reciproca-
tion by competitors.93  Thus, oligopolies can, and do, maintain
86. See BORK, supra note 50, at 137.
87. The economic camp has made many other assertions about the economic nature of antitrust
law's goals. Because the Brooke Group case, supra notes 1-9 and infra notes 131-65, focuses on below-
cost pricing, those other assertions will not be considered in this Note. For a discussion of those
assertions, see generally BORK, supra note 50.
88. BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 1, at 617. Economists define an oligopoly as "a market
dominated by a few sellers at least several of which are large enough relative to the total market to be
able to influence the market price." Id.
89. For an analysis of monopolies, see supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
90. ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON ANTITRUST 507
(1989).
91. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 33, at 445. The main obstacle to achieving an effective
oligopolistic market structure is that it is hard to get firms to agree on the proper price. "Price
leadership" effectively gets around this problem. Id.
92. Id. The price that the leader charges will depend on many factors, one of which is the question
of whether the price followers will restrain production or will instead produce more due to the higher
price. For a general discussion on how price leaders set price, see id. at 445-46.
93. Id. at 443, Some commentators feel that the oligopoly theory outlined above "is little more
than a guess about the ways in which firms might be able to behave in a market composed of a few
sellers " See, e.g., BORK, supra note 50, at 92. Such commentators believe that the temptation to cheat
on the oligopoly price structure would be too great and would lead to the breakdown of any potential
oligopoly. The temptation to gain additional business with only a small price reduction will tend to
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supracompetitive prices without an express agreement. When oligopolists
achieve and maintain supracompetitive price levels, they create a decrease,
in consumer welfare similar to that which results from a monopolist's
pricing scheme.94
Although oligopolies, and their accompanying consumer welfare losses,
currently pervade the American business landscape,95 attempts to stem the
growth of oligopolies have achieved little success. Congress has considered
legislation aimed at preventing mergers that might result in undue market
concentration;96 yet, markets continue to evolve into oligopolist structures
through internal growth.97 The current legal apparatus does not provide a
mechanism for successful challenges to these market structures, and when
would-be enforcers have attempted to make use of the antitrust laws,98
their efforts have failed.9 Thus, to date, there does not exist an effective
method to deal with the prevalent oligopoly problem. Brooke Group's
recoupment requirement further frustrates this effort."t
IV. THE LAW OF PREDATORY PRICING BEFORE BROOKE GROUP
Congress has enacted several antitrust statutes' 0 intended to remedy
sever any tacit agreement within the oligopoly. Id. at 104. Therefore, these theorists argue that
"[a]ntitrust should not interfere with any firm size created by internal growth .... The high probability
is that any such interference will lead to a net loss in consumer welfare." Id. at 178. According to this
model, government should simply allow oligopolies to destroy themselves.
Actual market performance indicates, however, that this argument may be flawed. Successful
oligopolies exist throughout the United States economy. One need only look at the prices and profits
in the ready-to-eat cereal industry to appreciate this fact. See In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
94. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
95. See text accompanying supra notes 69-80, 88.
96. Id. at 508 (citing LAwRENCE A. SuLLIvAN, ANTIRUST LAW 128-29 (1977)).
97. Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 90, at 508.
98. Generally, they have tried to use either the Sherman Act or theFederal Trade Commission Act.
Id. at 507-08.
99. See Kellogg, 99 F.T.C. at 269. In Kellogg, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) refused to
take action against oligopolies in the ready-to-eat cereal industry for two reasons. First, the FTC refused
to impose the high cost of restructuring on the industry without a clear showing of predatory behavior
or conspiracy, Id. at 275 (Separate Opinion of Commissioner Clanton). Second, conduct remedies would
either be "intrinsically undesirable" or would simply not work. Id. at 278 (Separate Opinion of
Commissioner Clanton). Thus, the FTC did nothing to alleviate the oligopoly problem in this industry.
Id. at 269.
100. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text. See also Justice Stevens' dissent in Brooke
Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2598.
101. These include: the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of July
2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27,44 (1988) (originally enacted
as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730); and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-57a (1988) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717). Congress has
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the problems of concentrated industry 0 2 and to preserve competition. 3
For example, courts have construed both the Sherman Act"' and the
Robinson-Patman Act' to prohibit predatory pricing.
When a firm prices below its costs, it violates section 2 of the Sherman
Act."° Section 2 outlaws, among other things, monopolization.0
Proving illegal monopolization requires two elements: the existence of
monopoly power' and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power.' Courts define monopoly power as "the power to control prices
or exclude competition."" 0 Market share serves as the prime indicator by
which courts measure monopoly power.' Courts have held as little as
a seventy-five percent market share sufficient to show the existence of
monopoly power." 2 A sixty-percent market share, however, "probably"
would not constitute monopoly power under section 2."'
In addition to monopoly power, courts require antitrust plaintiffs to show
that the alleged monopolist obtained or maintains its monopoly through
some specific act or conduct."4 Predatory pricing satisfies this conduct
also amended the antitrust laws several times. These amendments include: the Robinson-Patman Anti-
Discriunation Act, 15 U.S.C. §13 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 1, 49
Stat. 1526); the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
(originally enacted as Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125); and the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1988) (Pub. L. 94-435, Sept. 30, 1976,
90 Stat. 1383).
102. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 11-58 and accompanying text. Of course some scholars state that the
preservation of competition for consumer welfare was the only goal of these laws. See supra Part II.
104. For relevant text, see supra note 56.
105. For relevant text, see supra note 29.
106. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
955 (1983); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
107. For relevant text, see supra note 56.
108. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
109. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see also United States v. Aluminum
Co of Am. (ALCOA), 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
110. DuPont, 351 U.S. at 391.
111. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp, 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afjfdper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
112. Id. at 343-46.
113. See ALCOA, 91 F. Supp. at 333 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)).
114. For examples of the type of conduct that satisfies this requirement, see ALCOA, 91 F. Supp
333 (expanding capacity to meet all the demand which the company had created); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (using monopoly power in one geographic area to foreclose competition
in other areas); United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 323-46 (using leases to deter customers from buying from
a competitor).
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requirement.'15 The term predatory pricing refers to "the deliberate
sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving rivals out of the
market and then recouping the losses through higher profits earned in the
absence of competition.""' 6 Thus, proof of below-cost pricing is needed.
Early court decisions provided only vague definitions of "below
cost.' 1 7 Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner subsequently
devised an economic method to determine when a firm engages in
predatory pricing."' Areeda and Turner's model concludes that a price
at or above the firm's average variable cost is nonpredatory per se.119
When a firm sells below its average variable cost, however, the intrinsic
115. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
955 (1983).
116. 3 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 49, 711b, at 151.
117. See, e.g., National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1966); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47,
53 (1st Cir. 1964), cert denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517
(6th Cir. 1944).
118. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 59. To facilitate understanding of this approach, though, a
few economic terms referring to alternative measures of cost need to be defined. First, "fixed costs" are
"costs that do not vary with changes in output." Id. at 700. These include costs such as an investment
in a building or in machinery to make a product. "Variable costs" are those costs that will increase as
the firm's production expands. Id. Examples of variable costs include labor or fuel used to produce
goods. "Average variable cost" is the aggregate of all variable costs divided by the total output. Finally,
economists define "marginal cost" as "the increment to total cost that results from producing an
additional increment of output." Id.
119. Id. at 732-33. Areeda and Turner reached this result by first asking which of the various
economic costs is relevant to the predatory pricing issue. Id. at 701. The authors looked at how firms
maximize profits in order to answer their first question, because "a firm which seeks to [maximize
profits] is normally responding to acceptable economic incentives and thus is not engaging in predatory
behavior." Id.
The profit-maximizing point for any firm is the point at which any decrease in production would
decrease revenues more than it decreases costs or, conversely, where any increase in production would
increase costs more than it would increase revenues. Id. This occurs when market price equals the
marginal cost. Id. at 702. Thus, any firm charging its marginal cost acts as a normal competitor and is
not engaged in predatory pricing. The relevant cbst is, therefore, the marginal cost. Id. at 702-03.
Areeda and Turner went on to conclude that pricing above marginal cost should be per se legal while
pricing below marginal cost is per se predatory pricing. Id. at 712-13.
Areeda and Turner, however, did not ultimately use marginal cost as the dividing line between
predatory and nonpredatory behavior. Instead, they chose average variable cost to serve as that dividing
line. Id. at 716. They justified this choice because of the difficulty that administrators of the rule would
have in ascertaining a firm's marginal cost. Id. Courts may use average variable cost as a replacement
because at most firm's production points, the average variable cost will be equal to or greater than
marginal cost. Thus, at worst, a test based on average variable cost will be more permissive than one
based on marginal cost. In addition, one can more readily find a firm's average variable costs from its
accounting books. Id. at 717-18. For these reasons, Areeda and Turner chose average variable cost as
the relevant dividing line between predatory and nonpredatory behavior.
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conclusion is that the firm has engaged in predatory pricing. 2 ' Applying
these guidelines, Areeda and Turner's test is intended to protect from
liability those firms engaged in "legitimate, competitive pricing...'
Although the Supreme Court has declined to decide the issue," the
federal circuit courts have generally accepted the use of average variable
cost as the appropriate measure in determining below-cost pricing.
However, the circuits have not fully adopted Areeda and Turner's per se
rules. Instead, these courts have used average variable costs merely to
establish a presumption in favor of one of the parties to a predatory pricing
claim.' 3
In Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp.,24 the Ninth Circuit
stated the general test for below-cost pricing as follows:
If the defendant's prices were... above average variable cost, the plaintiff
bears the burden of showing the defendant's pricing was predatory. If,
however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were below average
variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of predatory
pricing and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the prices were
justified without regard to any anticipated destructive effect they might have
on competitors."
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's Brooke Group decision, in order to
prevail in a predatory pricing suit under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a
plaintiff essentially needed to demonstrate that a defendant firm priced
below its average variable CoSt.
126
120. Areeda & Turner, supra note 59, at 733. Thus, a monopolizing company "may not defend on
the grounds that [its] price was 'promotional' or merely met an equally low price of a competitor." Id.
121. Seeid. at 699.
122. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,2587 n.1 (1993).
123. See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 955 (1983).
124. Id
125. Id. at 1386. The court stated several reasons for adopting this test rather than an exact replica
of the Areeda-Turner test. Among these reasons were the following: that prices above average variable
cost might still be predatory, as in the case of limit pricing schemes; that courts should look at both the
short-run and the long-run consequences of price cuts; that cost estimations are inherently uncertain;
and that courts do not want to give monopolies a "fi-ee zone" in which to exploit their power. Id. at
1386-87.
126. Furthermore, the circuits are divided as to a plaintiff's burden when a defendant firm's prices
are above its average total cost Compare Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1386-88 with Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp, 724 F.2d 227, 236 (lst Cir. 1983). The First Circuit deems this
pricing policy to be per se legal, Wright, 724 F.2d at 236, under the rationale that prices above average
total cost will infrequently be anticompetitive. Id. at 234-35. In Transamerica, on the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit established a different approach to this situation. 698 F.2d at 1388. When a defendant
19951
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A plaintiff firm may also bring a predatory pricing claim under section
2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 2 7
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, courts refer to a below-cost pricing
scheme designed to eliminate competition with one's own competitor as
primary line discrimination.' Aside from this difference in terminology,
proving a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act requires essentially the
same elements as under the Sherman Act. 9 Thus, before Brooke Group,
a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act was
required to show only that the defendant priced below average variable
cost.
130
V. THE BROOKE GROUP ADDITION: A RECOUPMENT ELEMENT
In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Supreme Court added a recoupment element to a predatory pricing
firm's prices are above its average total costs, the Ninth Circuit will require a plaintiff to prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant's pricing policy constitutes predatory behavior. Id.
Of course, factors other than average variable cost may influence a determination that predatory
pricing has occurred, but the basic element in the cases cited herein is the requirement that a plaintiff
show that a defendant has priced below the defendant's average variable cost. For views that disagree
with the prevailing use of the average variable cost test, see Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A
Frameworkfor Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L. 213, 265-69 (1979); POSNER, supra
note 77, at 191-93; William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence ofPrice Reductions: A Policyfor Prevention
of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE LJ. 1, 9-11 (1979); Richard Sehmalensee, On the Use of Economic
Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1018-19 (1979); F.M. Scherer, Some
Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HAPv. L. REv. 901 (1976).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). For the specific language of the Robinson-Patman Act, see supra note
29.
128. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). Secondary line injury consists
of "discrimination which disadvantages a disfavored buyer in its competition with a favored buyer."
Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 90, at 209.
129. See, e.g., Henry v. Chloride Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1335 (8th Cir. 1987); D.E. Rogers Assocs.,
Inc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1439 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984);
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1041 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Malcom v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 853 n.16 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551
F.2d 790, 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
Differences do exist, however, in how closely courts require a defendant to have come to harming
competition. As the Supreme Court stated, "we interpret § 2 of the Sherman Act to condemn predatory
pricing when it poses 'a dangerous probability of actual monopolization,' whereas the Robinson-Patman
Act requires only that there be 'reasonable possibility' of substantial injury to competition before its
protection are triggered." Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2587 (1993).
130. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
131. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
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claim.'32 Brooke Group involved the highly concentrated American
cigarette industry.'33 Along with four other cigarette producers, the
plaintiff and defendant, commonly known as Liggett and Brown &
Williamson, respectively, essentially control cigarette production in the
United States.'34 This six-firm industry functions as a traditional oligopo-
ly. 3' For example, over a period of several years, cigarette prices
increased in "lock-step" twice a year regardless of any changes in
production costs, and the Brooke Group Court found evidence that these
prices surpassed those that would have been charged under competi-
tion.13
6
By 1980, the cigarette market had changed significantly. Due to
transformations in health habits, demand for cigarettes decreased.' This
decrease in demand had a particularly harsh effect on the plaintiff, Liggett.
Liggett's market share had deteriorated from twenty percent to a mere two
percent. 3
8
In order to boost its business, Liggett took the extreme measure of
decreasing the price of its cigarettes. 139 Moreover, it did so in an unusual
manner. In an apparent attempt to avoid the fury of the other
oligopolists,"' Liggett introduced a new line of generic cigarettes at a
price almost thirty percent below the price of branded cigarettes.' 4 ' These
generics were an instantaneous success, and Liggett's market share grew to
over four percent by early 1984.42
The growth of Liggett's market share came at the expense of the five
other cigarette producers. 143 Thus, the other producers were compelled to
respond.'" The defendant, Brown & Williamson, took the most severe
132. Id. at 2588.
133. Id. at 2582-83.
134 Id. at 2582.
135, See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
136 Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2583.
137. Id.
138. Id. The "effects of non-price competition" also had a negative impact on Liggett's market
share. Id.
139. Id.
140. For a description of how oligopolists often respond to a price cut in an oligopolistic industry
setting, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
141. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2583.
142. Id.
143. d.
144. Id. This represents a classic oligopolistic response. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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action by introducing its own brand of generics. 45 Moreover, Brown &
Williamson sold its generics at a price substantially below Liggett's. 14 6
Liggett then matched Brown & Williamson's prices and precipitated a price
war. 47 Liggett alleged that, by the end of the price war, Brown &
Williamson sold its generic cigarettes below cost.'48
At this point, Liggett had two choices: it could either sell its cigarettes
at a loss and try to beat the financially stronger Brown & Williamson'49
or it could file an antitrust lawsuit. 50 Liggett chose to sue Brown &
Williamson under the Robinson-Patman Act, alleging primary line price
discrimination. 5'
The Supreme Court began its legal analysis of Liggett's claim by
explaining that a primary line price discrimination action requires the same
analysis as a predatory pricing action under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 52 The Court then went on to state that, under both the Sherman Act
and the Robinson-Patman Act, there are two prerequisites to recovery. 53
The first element reflects traditional predatory pricing precedent: 54 the
plaintiff must show that the defendant set prices below an appropriate
measure of costs. 55
The Court then went on to state a second, and new, element of the
below-cost pricing test: the recoupment element. The Court held that a
plaintiff must show that the defendant has "a reasonable prospect" or a
145. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct at 2584. Among the oligopolists in the industry, Brown &
Williamson felt the most severe effects of Liggett's action because their customers were some of the
most price-sensitive in the market. Id. at 2583. In fact, although Brown & Williamson's market share
equalled only 11.4% of the market, 20% of Liggett's new generic cigarette customers used to smoke
Brown & Williamson's brands. Id. Thus, of the remaining five producers, Brown & Williamson had
the most incentive to respond in kind to Liggett's price cuts. I.
146. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2584. Brown & Williamson beat Liggett's prices by offering
larger volume discounts. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Because Liggett was in dire straits at the time, see supra note 137 and accompanying text, and
Brown & Williamson had a stronger base due to its larger market share, see supra note 145 and
accompanying text, Liggett could not sustain the losses for long and probably would have gone out of
business.
150. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
152. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2587.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 101-30 and accompanying text.
155. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2587-88. As stated above, the Court refused to address the
question of the appropriate measure of cost. Id. at 2587 n.l. Thus, the division among the circuit courts
as to the appropriate standard remains unresolved. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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"dangerous probability"'56 of recouping its losses from the alleged below-
cost pricing scheme. The Court based this recoupment element on two
grounds. First, proof that a firm has the ability to recoup losses from
below-cost pricing demonstrates that the firm also has achieved monopoly
power over its industry. 157 If the predator cannot recoup its losses through
monopoly pricing, the only result of below-cost pricing is a temporary
decrease in the price of the particular good. This temporary price drop, the
Court reasoned, would only enhance consumer welfare and thus benefit
society.' 5 The Court expressly downplayed the fact that below-cost
pricing "encourage[s] some inefficient substitution toward the product being
sold at less than its cost. ' 159 Second, the Court justified the addition of
a recoupment requirement on the basis that Congress had passed the
antitrust laws for "the protection of competition, not competitors."'"
Thus, the Court reasoned, the mere fact that below-cost pricing will inflict
painful losses on its victim does not mandate the protections of the antitrust
laws. 6' Without the ability to recoup its losses, the alleged predatory firm
has not injured competition and therefore has not violated the antitrust laws.
Having created the new recoupment requirement, the Brooke Group
Court then held that the defendant's actions did not meet the recoupment
element for two reasons particular to an oligopolist market structure. First,
in an oligopoly setting, it is unlikely that prices will remain high without
express coordination among the industry participants.162 Second, produc-
ers operating under an oligopolist framework are forced to share any
supracompetitive prices earned by virtue of their explicit or tacit collu-
sion. 63 However, when a single firm, such as Brown & Williamson,
incurs the losses necessary to carry out a below-cost pricing scheme, this
firm must bear all the losses on its own. Thus, the Brooke Group Court
estimated that a firm in Brown & Williamson's position, in order to recoup
its losses effectively in the tightly oligopolistic American cigarette market,
156. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588. The choice between these two standards depends on
whether the case is brought under the Robinson-Patman Act or the Sherman Act. See supra Part IV.
In Brooke Group, the plaintiff sued under the Robinson-Patman Act. 113 S. Ct. at 2578.
157. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962)) (emphasis in original).
161. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
162. Id. at 2590.
163. Id.
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would have to earn nine dollars in supracompetitive profits for each dollar
it chose to lose in its alleged predatory scheme."6 Given the low
probability of this scenario occurring, the Court concluded that Brown &
Williamson could not have engaged in either primary line pricing or
predatory pricing, despite having sold cigarettes at prices below its
costs.165 By so holding, the Court created a new element to a below-cost
pricing antitrust claim.
VI. AN IMPROPER ADDITION
The problems resulting from the new recoupment element affect nearly
all parts of society. Members of both the economic and noneconomic
camps would disagree with the Court's improper addition. 66 The new
requirement fails to limit, and even exacerbates, one of the greatest
problems facing antitrust and the American economy to-
day-oligopolies. 167 As a remedy, this Note calls for the elimination of
the recoupment requirement or, in the alternative, its liberal interpretation
by lower courts.
Initially, the Brooke Group decision is inconsistent with the views of the
noneconomic camp. As stated above, scholars in the noneconomic camp
believe that Congress passed the antitrust laws for important social reasons
in addition to the goal of protecting economic efficiency.1 61 One major
social policy goal inherent in the antitrust laws is that of protecting small
businesses from unfair competition.1 69 In fact, Congress passed the
Robinson-Patman Act17 solely to protect small businesses.1 '
The recoupment requirement completely ignores this congressional intent.
A large producer attempting to eliminate its smaller competitor with below-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2598. Justice Stevens, in dissent, stated his belief that a violation of the antitrust laws
did in fact occur in this case. In Stevens' view, the evidence showed that Brown & Williamson intended
to harm Liggett and in fact did so. Id. at 2601 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Brown & Williamson desired
to discipline Liggett and return the price to supracompetitive levels. Id. at 2603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The evidence also showed that Brown & Williamson believed that their plan would work and that they
would profit from it. Id. To Stevens, this behavior constituted a violation of the antitrust laws. Id. at
2604 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. See supra Part II.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). For the Robinson-Patman Act's language, see supra note 29. The
plaintiff in Brooke Group sued under the Robinson-Patman Act. See supra note 151.
171. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text..
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cost pricing inflicts injury on the small business simply by its
anticompetitive behavior. The ability of the large competitor to recoup its
losses does not affect the magnitude of injury to the small competitor, who
has been driven out of business. Therefore, the recoupment requirement
makes the intentional elimination of small businesses more possible by
restricting protection against anticompetitive behavior until the unlikely
point at which a plaintiff could prove the probability of recoupment.'72
That the Supreme Court misunderstood a major goal of the antitrust laws
is also illustrated by their reliance on Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.
t73
The Court quoted Brown Shoe for the proposition that the antitrust laws
"protect competition and not competitors."174 In reality, Brown Shoe does
not stand for this proposition. The text in Brown Shoe immediately
following the language quoted in Brooke Group evinces that Court's
recognition that the antitrust laws also aim to protect small businesses.'75
Thus, the Brooke Group Court ignored and thwarted Congress' goal of
protecting small business when it added a recoupment requirement to
below-cost pricing claims.
Even those who believe that the goal of antitrust laws should be
economic efficiency 176 have reason to oppose the Brooke Group decision.
The Court made light of the effects that below-cost pricing has on
172, Predatory pricing can now occur at will because it does not seem likely that the Court will
ever find that recoupment is possible. Brooke Group remains a prime example: the Court did not find
recoupment even where the facts clearly showed a strong probability of recoupment following the
abandonment of the existing below-cost pricing scheme. As Justice Stevens' dissent points out:
At the end of 1985, the list price of branded cigarettes was $33.15 per carton, and the list
price of black and whites, $19.75 per carton. Over the next four years, the list price on both
branded and black and white cigarettes increased twice a year, by identical amounts. The June
1989 increases brought the price of branded cigarettes to $46.15 per carton, and the price of
black and whites to $33.75 ....
The expert economist employed by Liggett testified that the post-1985 price increases were
unwarranted by increases in manufacturing or other costs, taxes, or promotional expenditures.
Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (citations omitted).
173. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
174. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320) (emphasis in
onginal).
175. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. This is such an important point that the full
quotation from the Brown Shoe opinion is worth repeating here. The Court stated: "It is competition and
not competitors which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344.
176. For a discussion of the economic camp's views, see supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
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allocative efficiency.' 77  However, when a firm prices below cost,
consumers overpurchase.' 78 Consequently, scarce resources are directed
toward the predator's industry when society would otherwise put them to
a more socially desirable USe. 179 In this way, below-cost pricing destroys
allocative efficiency.' 0
Scholars in the economic camp argue that the laws prohibiting predatory
pricing attempt to arrest the loss of the economic efficiency similar to that
caused by monopolies.' 8' In the monopoly situation, however, the
problem is reversed, resources are directed out of the monopolized industry
though they could better be used there.'82 As with below-cost pricing, this
results in a misallocation of goods.8 3 A reallocation of the goods through
the workings of competitive market forces would, therefore, increase
consumer welfare in both situations.'" If the noneconomic camp is
correct, the antitrust laws should attempt to stop the inefficient act of
below-cost pricing regardless of whether it actually results in the creation
of a monopoly.8 5
Finally, the Brooke Group decision is problematic because it adds to the
already pervasive oligopoly problem.'86 As noted by the dissent in Brooke
Group, the cigarette industry was in fact an oligopoly.'8 7 The natural
177. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
178. See generally BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 1, at 634.
179. Id.
180. Some scholars argue that because predatory pricing rarely occurs, and because most price
decreases are the result of advances in technology or the achievement of superior efficiency, we should
not prosecute claims of below-cost pricing. BORK, supra note 50, at 154. Prosecuting below-cost pricing
will too often turn beneficial price reductions into illegal acts due to mistaken judgments as to the intent
behind a price reduction. Id. These mistakes, according to this group of scholars, will dampen the
incentives to advance technology or achieve superior efficiency. Id.
However, these concerns, simply do notjustify the outright elimination of protection from predatory
pricing, nor do they support making a below-cost pricing claim extremely difficult to win. Predatory
pricing does, upon occasion, exist. Areeda & Turner, supra note 59, at 697-99. Courts must therefore
take care in deciding below-cost pricing claims to guard against the concerns raised by scholars such
as Bork. Id. at 699. Yet, the predatory pricing laws prior to Brooke Group accomplished this goal. The
laws did so by using the average variable cost method first advocated by Areeda and Turner. See supra
notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
183. See generally PiNDYCK & RunmnELD, supra note 33, at 352.
184. See supra notes 69-80, 89 and accompanying text.
185. A below-cost pricer must achieve monopoly or oligopoly power in order to recoup its losses.
Thus, requiring that a monopoly actually exist before a predatory pricing claim may successfully be
maintained is simply another way of imposing a recoupment requirement.
186. See supra Part m1.
187. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2599 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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destruction of an oligopoly will occur only under the right conditions, when
firms become willing to cheat on the system.'88 Liggett attempted to rebel
against the cigarette oligopoly and may have destroyed the oligopoly
pricing structure in that industry. 89 To Liggett's dismay, however, its
attempt triggered Brown & Williamson's below-cost pricing scheme."
Brown & Williamson used the below-cost pricing tactic to force Liggett to
get its prices back in line with the oligopoly's supracompetitive prices.19'
Liggett had two choices at the time, or so it thought. 92 It could either
raise its prices and perpetuate the oligopoly or it could sue Brown &
Williamson for an antitrust violation. Liggett attempted to make appropriate
use of the antitrust laws, but the Court's new recoupment requirement
defeated its efforts. The Court limited future plaintiffs' range of choices to
one: perpetuating the oligopoly structure. 193 As a result, the Court's
recoupment requirement gives oligopolists a method to maintain their
oligopolies: below-cost pricing.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, Brooke Group, rather than being "a boon to consumers," 94 is
a bust to society. Small business owners lose the valuable protection of the
antitrust laws' prohibitions against below-cost selling. Society loses a
portion of its wealth due to the misallocation of resources. Moreover,
oligopolists gain another tool in perpetuating their oligopolies, a major
problem in the United States economy. Thus, the Supreme Court should
abandon the recoupment requirement.
However, until the Court chooses to overrule Brooke Group, interim
measures are needed to limit the harsh effects of this new requirement.
Lower courts should take a liberal approach to enforcement of the
recoupment requirement, to prevent producers from using it to maintain
their oligopolies. Setting standards for establishing probable recoupment
that can be easily met by plaintiffs could achieve this goal. For example,
courts could readily find barriers to entry in the below-cost pricer's industry
that will make proving the recoupment element more possible. Large initial
188. See supra note 91-93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
191. See Justice Stevens' dissent in Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2603.
192. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
193. See text accompanying supra note 186.
194. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
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capital outlays can almost always be found necessary to enter an industry,
thus creating a barrier to entry. When barriers to entry exist, the possibility
that losses from predatory pricing can be recouped is increased because the
probability that new market entrants will replace the forced out competitor
is decreased. If these barriers are high enough, then all the losses can be
recouped.'95 Thus, a court would be justified in finding the recoupment
requirement per se satisfied where large capital outlays are necessary for
market entry. This interpretation would reduce or eliminate the harsh effects
of the Brooke Group requirement. 6 Our need for competition'97
requires no less.
David J. Kates
195. See supra note 59.
196. Id.
197. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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